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Introduction 
• Phishing: uses spoofed websites to steal users’ 







• Phishing reporting and verification services: 
– APWG & PhishTank 
 
• Phishing attacks have also been quickly evolving 




Introduction – cont. 
• First-layer context: a spoofed email or instant 
message 
– To lure users to the phishing websites 
 
• The success is limited by two constraints 
– If phishing emails or instant messages are 
suspicious 
• Users would not click on phishing URLs 
– If phishing emails are captured by spam filters 
• Cannot even reach users in the first place 
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Introduction – cont. 
• Second-layer context: look and feel similar to a 
targeted legitimate website 
– To lure users to submit their login credentials 
 
• The success is limited by two constraints 
– If phishing websites trigger warnings if they are 
detected by browsers 
 
 
– If the look and feel of the undetected phishing 




• We explore the feasibility of the extreme of 
phishing attacks! 
– that have the almost identical look and feel as 
those of the targeted legitimate websites 
 
• We evaluate the effectiveness of such phishing 
attacks by performing a user study 
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Metrics for Look and Feel 
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• The appearance: page layouts, text contents, images, styles 
• The page depth: the levels of webpages that are organized and linked together 
• The support to dynamic user interaction: user interactions such as clicking, 
searching, and form submission as well as the triggered JavaScript executions 
• The phishing types: traditional phishing and Web Single Sign-On (SSO) phishing 
• We focus on the second-layer context 
Web Single Sign-On (SSO) ? 
• Sign in multiple relying party 
(RP) websites using one single 
identity provider (IdP) account. 
 
• Users are relieved from the 
huge burden of registering 




A Measurement of Existing Phishing Websites 
• In 2015, measured and inspected 471 live phishing 
websites reported on PhishTank 
– 30% do not contain any link 
– 22% contain invalid links 
– 17.6% contain links to the targeted legitimate websites 
– 26.4% contain links to other websites 
 
• The majority of them, 449 (95%) of 471 – Simple phishing 
• Only a handful of them – Advanced Phishing  
– 2 Yahoo, 7 Paypal, and 11 Gmail are mostly similar 
– 2 Paypal contain over two levels of webpages 
– 10 phishing websites support low-quality Web SSO phishing 
 
• None of them – Extreme Phishing 
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• Our toolkit needs to ensure that all the links on each 
phishing webpage will be modified to point to the 
phishing website. 
– To keep holding visitors on a phishing website. 
– To maximize the chances of collecting their login credentials. 
 
• Static Link Substitution:  
– Legitimate domain -> phishing domain & HTTPS -> HTTP & 
customizable rules for special links (in <head> and <script>) 
 
• Dynamic Link Substitution:  
– Injects JavaScript to intercept the dynamic link generation and 
modification events & legitimate domain -> phishing domain & 
HTTPS -> HTTP 10 
Web SSO Login Window Generation 
• More profitable and insidious because 
– The value of IdP accounts is highly concentrated 
– The attack surface area is highly enlarged 
– The difficulty of phishing detection is highly increased 
 
 
• We achieve 
– The automatic and dynamic construction 
– The automatic inclusion of Web SSO phishing login 
windows 
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The Single Sign-On login windows on the Sears phishing website  
(the fake Yahoo, Facebook, and Google login “windows” have the almost 
identical look and feel as those of legitimate login windows) 
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User Study 
• We provided a computer for all the participants 
– Modified the hosts file 
– Installed and configured five popular browsers 
• This testbed – Realistic! 
– Allows participants to use their real login credentials 
– Perform real browsing activities 
• Participants - 94 adults 
– 57 younger (18-38 years), 37 older (50-88 years) 
– 62 female, 32 male 
• Each participant performed 4 tasks on 4 websites 
– 2 were extreme phishing websites (traditional, SSO) 
– 2 were legitimate websites (traditional, SSO) 
– Each task – browse the corresponding website as he or she 
usually does, log into it, and sign out 




User Study - Summary 
• 87 (92.6%) were not suspicious about extreme phishing 
websites 
• 91 (96.8%) submitted their login credentials to extreme 
phishing websites 
• No significant difference in lack of susceptibility to the entire 
phishing testbed  between  
– Those who did and did not report noticing something 
suspicious about the Web browsing tasks 
– Those who with and without reported awareness of 
phishing 
– Those who with and without a past history of reported 
phishing susceptibility 
• Note that the success rate of existing phishing attacks in terms of the second-layer 
context is about 10% as reported in previous measurement studies. 
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Conclusion 
• Explored the extreme phishing attacks and 
investigated the techniques for constructing them 
• Designed and implemented a concrete toolkit 
– Traditional phishing and Web SSO phishing 
– Automatically construct unlimited levels of phishing 
webpages based on user interactions 
• Designed and performed a user study with 94 
participants 
• Demonstrated that extreme phishing attacks are 
indeed highly effective 
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